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Igazságos kockázatfelosztás nem likvid piacokon 
 
CSÓKA PÉTER  
 
 
Összefoglaló 
 
Tekintsünk egy tőkeáttételes pénzügyi vállalatot, amelynek nem likvid portfóliókat tartó 
divíziói vannak! Koherens kockázati mértékek használata esetén a divíziók 
tőkekövetelményének összege nagyobb, mint a vállalat tőkekövetelménye, diverzifikációs 
előny keletkezik, amelyet valahogy el kell osztani a divíziók jobb teljesítményértékelése 
végett. Ebben a tanulmányban kooperatív játékelmélet és szimuláció segítségével elemezzük 
azt, hogy mennyire lehet nem likvid piacon három természetesnek tűnő igazságossági 
követelmény alapján felosztani a kockázatot: ezek a magbeliség (Core Compatibility), az 
egyenlő kezelés (Equal Treatment Property) és az erős monotonitás (Strong Monotonicity).  
A magbeliség követelménye az, hogy a divíziók tetszőleges koalíciójára (részhalmazára) 
legalább annyi kockázatot allokáljunk, mint amekkora kockázatnövekedést okoz az, ha a 
koalíció csatlakozik a többi divízióhoz.  Az egyenlően kezelés tulajdonság azt garantálja, hogy 
ha két divízió annyira szimmetrikus, hogy ugyanaz a kockázatuk és a divíziók összes, őket 
nem tartalmazó koalíciójához is ugyanakkora kockázattal járulnak hozzá, akkor ugyanannyi 
kockázatot kell rájuk osztani. Az erős monotonitás azt követeli meg, hogy ha egy divízió 
gyengén csökkenti az egyéni kockázatát és a többi divízió tetszőleges koalíciójához is 
kevesebb kockázatot tesz hozzá, akkor (ösztönzésképpen) a ráosztott tőke nem növekedhet. A 
szimulációs eredményeket elemezve arra a végkövetkeztetésre jutunk, hogy a legtöbb esetben 
nem likvid piacokon nem lehetséges a három igazságossági követelményt egyszerre 
teljesíteni, valamelyikről le kell mondanunk. 
 
Tárgyszavak: piaci mikrostruktúra, koherens kockázati mértékek, piaci likviditás, 
finanszírozási likviditás, portfólióteljesítmény-értékelés, tőkeallokáció, teljesen 
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Let us consider a financially constrained leveraged financial firm having some
divisions which have invested into some risky assets. Using coherent measures of
risk the sum of the capital requirements of the divisions is larger than the capital
requirement of the firm itself, there is some diversification benefit that should be
allocated somehow for proper performance evaluation of the divisions. In this paper
we use cooperative game theory and simulation to assess the possibility to jointly sat-
isfy three natural fairness requirements for allocating risk capital in illiquid markets:
Core Compatibility, Equal Treatment Property and Strong Monotonicity.
Core Compatibility can be viewed as the allocated risk to each coalition (subset)
of divisions should be at least as much as the risk increment the coalition causes by
joining the rest of the divisions. Equal Treatment Property guarantees that if two
divisions have the same stand-alone risk and also they contribute the same risk to
all the subsets of divisions not containing them, then the same risk capital should be
allocated to them. Strong Monotonicity requires that if a division weakly reduces its
stand-alone risk and also its risk contribution to all the subsets of the other divisions,
then as an incentive its allocated risk capital should not increase. Analyzing the
simulation results we conclude that in most of the cases it is not possible to allocate
risk in illiquid markets satisfying the three fairness notions at the same time, one has
to give up at least one of them.
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1 Introduction
Let us consider a financially constrained financial firm having some divisions (subunits)
which have invested into some risky assets and have some liabilities. As a cushion against
possible future losses, some capital (equity) should be held by the firm, otherwise it would
not be credible that it is able to pay back its liabilities. A coherent measure of risk (Artzner,
Delbaen, Eber, and Heath, 1999) assigns a number to the profit and loss distribution of
the value of the portfolio of the firm at a specific future point of time. When gross assets
(without netting the liabilities) are taken as the portfolio of the firm, then the measure
of risk reflecting the preferences of the regulator or the firm is negative, its absolute value
can be seen as a “safe valuation” of the assets. The capital requirement in this case can
be calculated in the following way: liabilities minus the safe value of the assets determined
by the measure of risk. Since the capital should be kept by the firm in riskless assets,
dividing the returns of the divisions by the respective capital requirements can serve as a
performance evaluation measure. Using coherent measures of risk the sum of the capital
requirements of the divisions is larger than the capital requirement of the firm itself, there
is some diversification benefit hat should be allocated somehow (for more details and
applications see Denault (2001), Kalkbrener (2005), Buch and Dorfleitner (2008), Homburg
and Scherpereel (2008), Kim and Hardy (2009), and Cso´ka, Herings, and Ko´czy (2009)
among others).
Cso´ka and Herings (2014) extend the usual cooperative game theory approach (risk
allocation games) to handle the problem of risk capital allocation when the divisions might
have illiquid assets by combining the notions of Cso´ka, Herings, and Ko´czy (2009) and
Acerbi and Scandolo (2008). To define a cooperative game one should assign a payoff to
all coalitions of players, that is to all subsets of the divisions. In a risk allocation game the
payoff of a coalition is the opposite of its risk, where risk is measured by using a coherent
measure of risk on the possible realizations of the value of the portfolio of the coalition.
When having illiquid portfolios, the realization value of the portfolio of a coalition in a
certain state depends on how easy it is to trade its assets (captured by random marginal
demand curves) and on the required composition of the portfolio (called liquidity policy).
To analyze how funding constraints affect fair risk allocation, in this paper we will use
cash liquidity policies with short sale constraints, where a certain amount of cash should
be generated and short sales are not allowed.1 The random marginal demand curves lead
to different optimal trades (sales) to satisfy the cash liquidity policy of the firm. After
executing optimal trades by the coalition of divisions, the realized value of the resulting
portfolio is determined by using the best bid prices of the resulting assets. Since the
1To cover the risk of upward moving prices, usually the proceeds of a short sale are not allowed to be
used in another transaction.
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coalitions of the divisions could trade at the same time, they face an externality problem:
their optimal trade depends on the trades done by the other divisions outside the coalition.
Cso´ka and Herings (2014) argue that the most reasonable way to handle this problem is
that the divisions outside the coalition at hand remains inactive, so their portfolios can be
considered as fixed and they define risk allocation games with liquidity this way.
Having the payoffs of the coalitions allows us to use standard game theory concepts (like
the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) or the nucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969)) as risk allocation
rules to split up the risk capital of the firm to its divisions in any possible situations. In
this paper we will assess the possibility to jointly satisfy three fairness requirements for
allocating risk capital in illiquid markets introduced by Cso´ka and Pinte´r (2014): Core
Compatibility, Equal Treatment Property and Strong Monotonicity. Core Compatibility is
satisfied if the risk of the firm is allocated in such a way that no coalition of the divisions
would have a lower risk by being alone. Such allocations are said to be in the core of the
game. Cso´ka and Pinte´r (2014) notes that Core Compatibility can also be viewed as the
allocated risk to each coalition of divisions should be at least as much as the risk increment
the coalition causes by joining the rest of the divisions. Equal Treatment Property guar-
antees that if two divisions have the same stand-alone risk and also they contribute the
same risk to all subsets of divisions not containing them, then the same risk capital should
be allocated to them. Strong Monotonicity requires that if a division weakly reduces its
stand-alone risk and also its risk contribution to all subsets of the other divisions, then as
an incentive its allocated risk capital should not increase.
A subgame is obtained by considering a subset of the divisions of the firm and looking
the resulting risk allocation game. A totally balanced game has a non-empty core in all
of its subgames. Cso´ka and Herings (2014) show that the class of risk allocation games
with liquidity coincides with the class of totally balanced games, generalizing the result
by Cso´ka, Herings, and Ko´czy (2009) for risk allocation game without liquidity. The
coincidence means that firstly, any totally balanced game can be generated by a properly
chosen risk allocation game with or without liquidity and secondly, it also means that any
risk allocation game with or without liquidity is totally balanced, that is Core Compatibility
alone can be satisfied. However, Cso´ka and Pinte´r (2014) show that on the class of totally
balanced games the Shapley value is the only risk allocation rule satisfying Equal Treatment
Property and Strong Monotonicity at the same time. However, it is well-known that the
Shapley value does not satisfy Core Compatibility in general, hence in theory the three
requirements are irreconcilable.
Looking at the impossibility problem from a practical perspective, the Shapley value
in a random but realistic risk allocation game with liquidity is not always expected to
satisfy Core Compatibility. Hence we can assess the possibility to allocate risk in a fair
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way in illiquid markets by checking the average Core Compatibility of the Shapley value
in such random risk environments with liquidity considerations. In the simulation we will
consider first 3, then 4 divisions and simulate 100 000 random risk allocation games with
liquidity. We will see that for 3 divisions in at least 30%, for 4 divisions in at least 50
% of the cases the Shapley value (being the only risk allocation rule which satisfies Equal
Treatment Property and Strong Monotonicity at the same time) does not satisfy Core
Compatibility, and for more divisions we can expect that the tendency continues. So we
can say that it is most of the time not possible to allocate risk in illiquid markets satisfying
the three fairness notions at the same time, one has to give up at least one of them.
We are aware of two papers doing similar simulations. Homburg and Scherpereel (2008)
are also checking the average Core Compatibility of the Shapley value (among other rules),
but in their setting Value at Risk is used (which is not a coherent measure of risk) and
there are no liquidity constraints. In their paper for 3 and 4 divisions the average Core
Compatibility of the Shapley value becomes 80-90%, but using Value at Risk the resulting
game is not totally balanced, and hence that result says nothing about the other two
fairness requirements. Balog, Ba´tyi, Cso´ka and Pinte´r (2014) discuss analytically which
out of the three fairness properties are met by seven different risk allocation methods. They
also simulate random risk allocation games with coherent measures of risk, for normal and
also for fat tailed return distributions. Without liquidity and for normal distribution our
results are comparable. However, they do not take into account illiquid assets.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we define risk allocation games
with liquidity constraint. Section 3 defines the Shapley value and discusses some of its
main properties to be used as fair. Section 4 contains the simulation results and Section 5
concludes.
2 Risk allocation games with liquidity constraints
We consider a firm with n divisions, whose risk capital should be allocated. Risk envi-
ronments with liquidity considerations are defined by Cso´ka and Herings (2014) and are
denoted by (N, J, S, pi, θ,m, L, ρ), where
• N is the set of divisions,
• S is the set of states of nature,
• state of nature s ∈ S occurs with probability pis > 0, where
∑
s∈S pis = 1,
• we have cash and J is the set of risky assets,
• θi = (θi0, θiJ) ∈ R× RJ = P is the initial portfolio of division i,
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• {msj} is the Marginal Demand Curve of asset j in state s ∈ S,
• L ⊆ RJ+1 is the liquidity policy, the set of portfolios which is deemed acceptable,
and
• ρ is a coherent measure of risk.
Next, we define all above mentioned elements in detail. We follow C¸etin, Jarrow and
Protter (2004), Jarrow and Protter (2005) and Acerbi and Scandolo (2008) in modeling
the order book for asset j in state s ∈ S by a marginal demand curve msj . A function is
ca`dla`g if it is right continuous with left limits and la`dca`g if it is left continuous with right
limits.
Definition 2.1. The marginal demand curve (MDC) for asset j ∈ J in state s ∈ S is
given by the map msj : R \ {0} 7→ R satisfying
(i) msj(x) ≥ msj(x′) if x < x′;
(ii) msj is ca`dla`g at x < 0 and la`dca`g at x > 0.
For asset j the amount msj(x) for x > 0 shows the marginal revenue the firm can get
by selling it, whereas msj(x) for x < 0 represents the marginal cost of buying it; m
s(0+j )
denotes the best bid and ms(0−j ) the best ask price.
The liquidation value of a portfolio will be needed to calculate attainable portfolios.
Definition 2.2. The liquidation mark-to-market value of a portfolio p ∈ P in state s ∈ S
is defined by
`s(p) = p0 +
∑
j∈J
∫ pj
0
msj(x)dx. (1)
The liquidation mark-to-market value of a portfolio equals to the portfolio’s cash plus
the revenue that the firm gets by selling long positions minus the cost, which has to be
paid to close short positions.
The set of portfolios attainable from some given portfolio p ∈ P in state s ∈ S by
liquidating all or part of it is given by
As(p) = {q ∈ P | q0 = `s(p0, pJ − qJ)}.
Given a portfolio p and liquidating pJ − qJ results in portfolio q where the cash is p0
plus the liquidation value of pJ − qJ .
The liquidity policy (Acerbi and Scandolo, 2008) incorporates the requirements imposed
by a regulator or the contractual obligations that have to be met, and specifies that the
portfolio of the firm should belong to the set L ⊂ P . In this paper we consider cash
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liquidity policies with short sale constraints, where the portfolio should contain at least
c ≥ 0 units of cash and short sales are not allowed: L(c) = {p ∈ P |p0 ≥ c and pJ ≥ 0}.
For a portfolio p ∈ P, we denote the assets hold long by J+(p) = {j ∈ J | pj > 0} and
the assets hold short by J−(p) = {j ∈ J | pj < 0}.
Definition 2.3. The uppermost mark-to-market value of a portfolio p ∈ P in state s ∈ S
is defined by
us(p) = p0 +
∑
j∈J+(p)
msj(0
+)pj +
∑
j∈J−(p)
msj(0
−)pj. (2)
In the uppermost mark-to-market value of a portfolio long positions are evaluated by
using the best bid prices and short positions are valued by using the best ask prices.
Artzner, Delbaen, Eber, and Heath (1999) have introduced coherent measures of risk.
A measure of risk is a function ρ : RS → R measuring the risk of a realization vector from
the perspective of the present. In our simulations we use a particular coherent measure of
risk, the k-Expected Shortfall (Acerbi and Tasche, 2002), which is the average of the worst
100k percent of the losses.
After completing the definition of a risk environment with liquidity considerations
(N, J, S, pi, θ,m, L, ρ) we can use tools from cooperative game theory to analyze them.
Let N denote the finite set of players. A cooperative game with transferable utility
(game, for short) is a function v : 2N → R such that v(∅) = 0. The class of games with
player set N is denoted by GN . For a game v ∈ GN and a coalition C ∈ 2N , a subgame vC
is obtained by restricting v to the subsets of C.
An allocation is a vector x ∈ RN , where xi is the payoff of player i ∈ N . An allocation
x yields payoff x(C) =
∑
i∈C xi to a coalition C ∈ 2N . An allocation x ∈ RN is called
Efficient, if x(N) = v(N) and Coalitionally Rational if x(C) ≥ v(C) for all C ∈ 2N . The
core (Gillies, 1959) is the set of Efficient and Coalitionally Rational allocations. The core
of game v is denoted by core (v). A game is totally balanced, if each of its subgame has a
non-empty core. Let GNtb denote the class of totally balanced games with player set N .
The question is how to define the cooperative game where the divisions (players) hold
illiquid portfolios. Cso´ka and Herings (2014) argue that the most reasonable way to han-
dle externalities in this setting is to assume that the complement of coalition C remains
inactive. The portfolios which are attainable for coalition C in state s ∈ S are given by
As(θ(C)), where θ(C) =
∑
i∈C θ
i. Inactivity of the complementary coalition means that
those divisions stick to their initial portfolio θ(N \ C).
Definition 2.4. Given a risk environment with liquidity considerations (N, J, S, pi, θ,m, L, ρ)
and a coalition of divisions C ⊂ N, the realization vector X(C) of coalition C is defined
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by
Xs(C) = sup{us(q)|q ∈ As(θ(C)) and q + θ(N \ C) ∈ Ls}, s ∈ S.
When calculating Xs(C), we consider the portfolios of the divisions outside the coalition
as fixed, and liquidate the portfolios of the divisions in C in such a way that the resulting
portfolio of the firm is attainable and satisfies the liquidity policy.
Definition 2.5. Given a risk environment with liquidity considerations (N, J, S, pi, θ,m, L, ρ),
the risk allocation game with liquidity constraints is the game (N, v), where the value func-
tion v : 2N → R is defined by
v(C) = −ρ(X(C)), C ∈ 2N . (3)
Let Γrl denote the family of risk allocation games with liquidity constraints with set of
players N.
Next, we introduce three fairness properties of risk allocation rules.
3 The Shapley value as a risk allocation rule
Throughout the paper we consider single-valued risk allocation rules. The function ψ :
A → RN , defined on A ⊆ GN , is called risk allocation rule on the class of games A if∑
i∈N φi = v(N), that is if the value of the whole firm is allocated, where φi specifies how
much the assets of division i is valued according to φ.
Let v ∈ GN and i ∈ N be a game and a player, and for all C ⊆ N let v′i(C) =
v(C ∪ {i})− v(C) denote player i’s marginal contribution to coalition C in game v. Then
v′i is called player i’s marginal contribution function in game v. Player i is a null-player in
game v, if v′i = 0. Moreover, players i and j are equivalent in game v, i ∼v j, if for any
C ⊆ N such that i, j /∈ C we have that v′i(C) = v′j(C).
Definition 3.1. For any game v ∈ GN the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) of player i , φi
is given by
φi(v) =
∑
C⊆N\{i}
v′i(C)
|C|!(|N \ C| − 1)!
|N |! i ∈ N. (4)
The Shapley value can be interpreted as follows. Players are entering into a room in
all possible permutations |N |! with equal probability. The Shapley value of a player is the
expected marginal contribution she makes to the coalition preceding her. Players before
her can enter |C|! ways, players after her can enter |N \ C| − 1)! ways.
Cso´ka and Pinte´r (2014) introduce four basic properties (axioms) a risk allocation rule
should satisfy.
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Definition 3.2. The risk allocation rule ψ on class A ⊆ GN satisfies
• Core Compatibility if for each v ∈ A: ψ(v) ∈ core (v),
• Equal Treatment Property if for each v ∈ A, i, j ∈ N : i ∼v j implies ψi(v) = ψj(v),
• Strong Monotonicity if for any v, w ∈ A, i ∈ N : v′i ≤ w′i implies ψi(v) ≤ ψi(w).
The financial interpretations of the axioms are as follows.
Core Compatibility is satisfied if the risk allocation rule results in a core allocation, in
which the risk of firm is allocated in such a way that no coalition of the divisions would
have a lower risk by being alone. Cso´ka and Pinte´r (2014) notes that Core Compatibility
can also be viewed as the allocated risk to each coalition of divisions should be at least as
much as the risk increment the coalition causes by joining the rest of the divisions.
Equal Treatment Property guarantees that if two divisions have the same stand-alone
risk and also they contribute the same risk to all subsets of divisions not containing them,
then the same risk capital should be allocated to them.
Strong Monotonicity requires that if a division weakly reduces its stand-alone risk and
also its risk contribution to all subsets of the other divisions, then as an incentive its
allocated risk capital should not increase.
Cso´ka and Herings (2014) show that the class of risk allocation games with liquidity
coincides with the class of totally balanced games, generalizing the result by Cso´ka, Herings,
and Ko´czy (2009) for risk allocation games without liquidity. The coincidence means that
at first, any totally balanced game can be generated by a properly chosen risk allocation
game with or without liquidity and secondly, it also means that any risk allocation game
with or without liquidity is totally balanced, that is Core Compatibility alone can be
satisfied. Note that the coincidence remains valid in our setting (using cash liquidity
policies with short sale constraints), since they show that using any liquidity policy the
generated game is totally balanced, and any totally balanced game can be generated by
using any liquidity policy with perfectly liquid assets. However, Cso´ka and Pinte´r (2014)
show that on the class of totally balanced games the Shapley value is the only risk allocation
rule concept satisfying Equal Treatment Property and Strong Monotonicity at the same
time, but it is well-known that it does not satisfy Core Compatibility in general, hence the
three requirements are irreconcilable. Thus the Shapley value in a random risk allocation
game with liquidity is not always expected to satisfy Core Compatibiliy. Hence we assess
the possibility to allocate risk in a fair way when we have illiquid markets by checking the
average Core Compatibility of the Shapley value in such random risk environments with
liquidity considerations.
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4 Simulation results
In the simulation we will consider first n = 3, then n = 4 divisions with the following
parameters and simulate 100 000 random risk allocation games with liquidity. We have
1000 states of nature having equal probability of occurrence, S = {1, . . . , 1000}. One can
look at it as considering daily market changes for 4 years. We have cash (euros) and
j = n risky assets, the set of possible portfolios is P = R×Rn. The initial portfolios of the
divisions in million units in case of 3 players are given by θ1 = (1, 1, 0, 0), θ2 = (2, 0, 1, 0) and
θ3 = (3, 0, 0, 1); in case of four players they are given by θ1 = (1, 1, 0, 0, 0), θ2 = (2, 0, 1, 0, 0),
θ3 = (3, 0, 0, 1, 0) and θ4 = (0, 0, 0, 0, 1). Thus each division has some non-negative cash
and 1 million units of an asset in which the other divisions have no positions. We normalize
the initial price of each risky asset to be 1000 and say that the initial investment into risky
assets for each division is 1000 million euros.
To define {msj}, the Marginal Demand Curve (MDC) of asset j in state s ∈ S we need
the following random numbers, where m ∈ {1, . . . , 100 000} labels the risk allocation game,
s ∈ S corresponds to the state and j ∈ {1, . . . , n} refers to the asset:
• Random covariance matrices Σm ∈ Rn×n, where Σmjj, the daily standard deviation of
rj, the logarithmic return of asset j is uniformly distributed between 1% and 4%.
• Joint normal distribution of the returns (rj) with mean 0 and covariance Σm.
• Let the market risk driver be Aj = 1000× erj and let the liquidity risk driver kj be
uniformly distributed between 1 and 50.
• We will use the exponential MDCs analyzed by Acerbi and Scandolo (2008), where
for state s ∈ S msj(x) = Asje−k
s
jx for x 6= 0.
Note that in state s the larger ksj is, the less liquid the market of asset j is. The best bid
of asset j is calculated as msj(0
+) = Asj .
The liquidity policy is the following: the portfolio of the firm should contain at least c
million euros and short sales are not allowed: L(c) = {p ∈ P |p0 ≥ c and pJ ≥ 0}.
To define the risk allocation game with liquidity constraints consider Definition 2.4.
Since both for 3 and 4 divisions the firm has in total 1 + 2 + 3 = 6 million euros and for
each coalition of the divisions the portfolio (and hence the cash) of the divisions outside of
the division is given, each coalition should generate a = c − 6 million euros by selling its
assets in an optimal way. We will consider three cases: a = 0, a = 10 and a = 15. Note
that if a = 0 (and thus c = 6, then there is no need to liquidate any assets.
Even though short sales are not allowed at the firm level, a coalition of divisions could
short sale assets owned by divisions outside the coalition, but it is not fair to allocate those
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proceeds to the coalition, thus we assume that a coalition can only generate cash by selling
the assets of its divisions.2 It follows from the calculations by Acerbi and Scandolo (2008)
that tsi (C), the optimal amount in millions to trade (sell) from asset i by division i in
coalition C ∈ N in state s ∈ S is given by
tsi (C) =
1
ksi
log(1 + λs(C)), (5)
where the marginal cost of liquidation per euro liquidated, λs(C) is given as
λs(C) =
a∑
i∈C
Asi
ksi
− a
. (6)
The realization vector of coalition C ∈ N in state s ∈ S is given by
Xs(C) =
∑
i∈C
Asi (θ
i − tsi (C)) + a, (7)
since tsi (C) determines how much division i should trade and the remaining portfolio is
valued by the uppermost value, which is the best bid, while coalition C generates a million
euros.
The measure of risk ρ is the expected shortfall with k = 1% and k = 5%. For each
coalition C ∈ 2N the risk allocation game with liquidity is defined by v(C) = −ρ(X(C)),
then the Shapley value is calculated by Equation (4). Then coalitional rationality of
the Shapley value should be checked for each coalition. If coalitional rationality is not
violated, then we have a core allocation and add one to a counter. If coalitional rationality
is violated, then the counter is not changing. After simulating 100 000 risk allocation games
with liquidity we divide the counter by 100 000 and get the average Core Compatibility of
the Shapley value. Example 4.1 illustrates the simulation by showing the calculations for
one realization of a risk allocation game with liquidity for 3 divisions.
Example 4.1. Let a = 15, k = 1% and let us see a realization of a risk allocation game
for 3 divisions.
The names of the columns of Table 1 are the coalitions (C), but the first three coalitions
can also be seen as the individual divisions (j). The table has three blocks: lines 1-3, 4-8
and 9-11. In the first two blocks we just have one state s, reflecting the realization of one
day out of 1000. In the third block other data from other 999 simulated days are also used.
In the first block for a particular day (s) for each asset (j) we can see the realized
logarithmic returns (rsj), the corresponding market risk drivers (best bid prices, A
s
j) and
2If we allowed short selling assets owned by divisions outside the coalition, then the optimal trade
of each coalition would be the same as the optimal trade of the grand coalition, the firm itself, weakly
decreasing the trading cost of the coalitions.
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C, j 1 2 3 {1, 2} {1, 3} {2, 3} {1, 2, 3}
rsj −1.88% −2.72% −2.94%
Asj 981.39 973.20 971.06
ksj 2.70 49.67 35.18
λs(C) 0.0430 3.2662 1.1902 0.0407 0.0398 0.4659 0.0379
ts1(C) 0.0156 0.0148 0.0145 0.0138
ts2(C) 0.0292 0.0008 0.0077 0.0007
ts3(C) 0.0223 0.0011 0.0109 0.0011
Xs(C) 981.07 959.77 964.42 1954.28 1952.15 1941.21 2925.36
ρ(X(C)) −896.59 −902.86 −942.33 −1815.86 −1905.34 −1893.40 −2817.90
v(C) 896.59 902.86 942.33 1815.86 1905.34 1893.40 2817.90
φ(C) 919.70 916.86 981.34 1836.56 1901.04 1898.20 2817.90
Table 1: One realization of a risk allocation game with liquidity
the realized liquidity risk drivers (ksj ) rounded to two decimals. Each asset had a falling
best bid price, asset 1 is the most liquid and asset 2 is the less liquid.
In the second block of Table 1 the marginal cost of liquidation per euro liquidated,
λs(C) is calculated by Equation (6) for a particular day (s). The resulting optimal trades
by division j are given by tsj(C) using Equation (5), the realization vector of the coalitions
Xs(C) are coming from Equation (7). For instance when divisions 2 and 3 trade together in
coalition {2, 3} instead of alone, then the marginal cost of liquidation per euro is decreased
from 3.2662 and 1.1902 to 0.4659; the trades required are also decreased from 0.0292 and
0.0223 to 0.0077 and 0.0109; and the values of the portfolios taking into the liquidity
considerations are increasing from 959.77+964.42= 1924.19 to 1941.21, the coalition is
saving on the trading costs.
In the last block of Table 1 first we can see the measure of risk of the coalitions ρ(X(C)),
which is the average of the worst k = 1% of the portfolio values, that is the average of
the opposite of the lowest 10 (=1000 × 1%) realizations of Xs(C). The risk of the firm,
-2817.90 can be interpreted as 2819.90 million euros is a safe valuation of the assets using
the preferences of the regulator or the firm. Hence 3000-2819.90=180.1 million euros is
the capital (equity) requirement of the firm, which, on the other side of the balance sheet
means that 180.1 million euros should be invested into a safe assets by the owners of the
firm. Note that we can again see diversification effects when combining individual divisions.
From v(C) = −ρ(X(C)) the Shapley value of division j, φj(v) is calculated using Equation
(4) and φ(C) =
∑
j∈C φj(v) is what the coalitions get when risk is allocated by the Shapley
value. To get Core Compatibility for each C the inequality v(C) ≤ φ(C) should hold, but
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for coalition {1, 3} it is violated, the payoff (safe valuation of the assets) to coalition {1, 3}
would be higher when they are without division 2 than when the payoff is allocated by
the Shapley value to them, hence the Shapley value in this example is not in the core, it
allocates capital requirements in an unfair way.
After simulating 100 000 risk allocation games with liquidity the average Core Compat-
ibility of the Shapley value are displayed using different parameter settings for 3 divisions
in Table 2 and for 4 divisions in Table 3.
a = 0 a = 10 a = 15
k = 1% 59.2% 62.8% 67.8%
k = 5% 59.9% 64.7% 70.7%
Table 2: Average Core Compatibility of the Shapley value in case of 3 divisions
a = 0 a = 10 a = 15
k = 1% 39.7% 41.7% 44.2%
k = 5% 40.2% 42.8% 46.5%
Table 3: Average Core Compatibility of the Shapley value in case of 4 divisions
Depending on the number of divisions each simulation lasted for about 2-5 minutes using
an average computer. Repeating the simulations the numbers only changed by about 0.1-
0.3%. We can confidently say that the average Core Compatibility of the Shapley value
is about 60-70 % for 3 divisions and about 40-47 % for 4 divisions. Both for 3 and for 4
divisions increasing the cash to be generated in the liquidity policy (a) clearly increases
Core Compatibility by about 5 to 10 percentage points, due to the extra diversification in
liquidity risk on top of market risk. Increasing k, the percentage of outcomes from which
the expected shortfall is calculated is also increasing Core Compatibility by about 0.5 to 3
percentage points. Note that both effects are lower for 4 divisions.
5 Conclusion
To conclude, we have observed in the simulations that for 3 divisions in at least 30%, for 4
divisions in at least 50 % of the cases the Shapley value (being the only risk allocation rule
which satisfies Equal Treatment Property and Strong Monotonicity at the same time) does
not satisfy Core Compatibility, and for more divisions we can expect that the tendency
continues. So we can state that in most of the cases it is not possible to allocate risk in
illiquid markets satisfying the three fairness notions (Equal Treatment Property and Strong
12
Monotonicity and Core Compatibility) at the same time, one has to give up at least one of
them. Balog, Ba´tyi, Cso´ka and Pinte´r (2014) suggest that either the Shapley value (being
not stable) or the nucleolus (being not incentive compatible) can be a good candidate.
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